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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1403 
___________ 
 
DARRELL JAMES PARKS, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
A. JORDAN, Discipline Hearing Officer 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-02912) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2014 
Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 4, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Darrell Parks, a federal inmate, appeals the District Court’s denial of his 
habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
modify the District Court’s judgment and affirm it as modified. 
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 On October 25, 2012, a correctional officer (“CO”) reportedly discovered Parks 
masturbating in his cell.  The CO reportedly instructed him to stop, but Parks failed to do 
so.  That same day, Parks was charged with “Engaging in a Sexual Act” and “Refusing to 
Obey a Direct Order.”  After a subsequent hearing before the Unit Discipline Committee 
(“UDC”), the charges were referred to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”).  At a 
hearing before the DHO, Parks denied engaging in a sexual act.  He asserted that he may 
have made “inappropriate or disrespectful comments” to the CO, and that he put up a 
sheet to block her view; the disciplinary report, he maintained, was in retaliation for those 
actions.  The DHO determined that, based on the greater weight of the evidence, Parks 
committed the violation of “Engaging in a Sexual Act.”  Parks’ sanctions included, inter 
alia, 30 days of disciplinary segregation. 
  Parks filed his § 2241 petition alleging that he was denied due process of law in 
his disciplinary hearings and, as a result, faces potential collateral consequences, 
including the denial of parole.  Parks further alleged that the disciplinary proceedings 
were held within hearing range of other prisoners and staff, thereby violating his right to 
privacy.  As relief, he sought expungement of his disciplinary records and an injunctive 
order requiring the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to record (by audio) all disciplinary 
proceedings henceforth.   
 The DHO, the respondent below, argued that the § 2241 petition should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Parks did not lose any good time credits, and, 
therefore, the petition did not directly implicate the fact or duration of his confinement, 
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which is the “essence of habeas.”  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  
The District Court determined that, because Parks alleged he was innocent of the 
disciplinary infraction, his due process claims arguably affected the duration of his 
confinement to the extent they had merit.  It thus retained jurisdiction with respect to 
those claims, and ultimately denied them on the merits.  The District Court dismissed the 
claim concerning the violation of  Parks’ right to privacy after de termining that it could 
not be raised in a § 2241 petition.  This appeal ensued.1     
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On appeal, the DHO argues 
that the District Court erred in failing to dismiss the entire § 2241 petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We exercise plenary review in determining whether the District Court was 
vested with subject matter jurisdiction.  Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d 
Cir. 2002).     
 Section 2241 authorizes a federal district court to exercise jurisdiction where the 
federal prisoner is challenging the execution, rather than the validity, of his sentence.  See 
Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012).   We have noted that “the precise 
meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 432 
F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005).  Nevertheless, it must involve a challenge to the manner in 
which the sentence is being “put into effect” or “carr[ied] out.”  Id. at 243.   
                                                 
1 On appeal, Parks does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of his right to privacy 
claim.  We therefore limit our review to the due process claims.  See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (failure to raise an issue in an opening brief 
waives the issue on appeal).   
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 Parks does not allege that the BOP is failing to “put into effect”  or “carry out” his 
sentence as imposed in the sentencing judgment.  Rather, his claim is that he will be 
denied parole as a consequence of his disciplinary infraction.  Parks provided evidence 
that he was twice denied parole, despite being eligible, because he continued to receive 
disciplinary infractions.  Specifically, the Parole Commission indicated that “[P]arole 
should be granted at this time. . . . However, a departure from the guidelines at this 
consideration is found warranted because . . . [y]ou are a more serious risk than shown by 
your point score because you have failed to maintain clear conduct while incarcerated.”  
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 16.  Parks argues, therefore, that his due process claims directly 
affect the duration of his confinement. 
 The fact that the disciplinary infraction may affect Parks’ chances at parole is 
insufficient to bring his due process claims within the ambit of habeas.  See Cardona, 681 
F.3d at 537 (where a claim will not “necessarily result in a change to the duration of a 
sentence,” it is not properly brought in habeas) (emphasis in original); see also Leamer v. 
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 543 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he fact that a prisoner’s success in the 
litigation might increase the chance for early release does not, in itself, transform the 
action into one for habeas corpus.”) (quoting  Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 
1087 (3d Cir. 1985)).   The Supreme Court made this clear in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 
U.S. 74 (2005), in which the petitioners sought to attack their parole-eligibility and 
parole-suitability proceedings.  The Court held that such an action does not lie at “the 
core of habeas corpus” where success “does not mean immediate release from 
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confinement or a shorter stay in prison” but rather, “at most [means] new eligibility 
review, which at most will speed consideration of [parole].”  Id. at 82 (emphasis in 
original).  Likewise, even if Parks is successful at expunging the disciplinary infraction at 
issue, parole is not a certainty; there are other factors which could affect his chances for 
parole, including other disciplinary infractions.2  Claims, such as Parks’, which if 
successful “would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release,” are not 
cognizable in habeas, but may be brought in a civil rights action.  Id. at 81 (emphasis in 
original); see also Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542 (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of 
confinement such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo 
his conviction, [a civil rights action] is appropriate.”).   
 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Parks’ due process claims were not 
properly brought in a habeas petition under § 2241, and as such, the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.  Dismissal should be without prejudice to 
Parks’ ability to pursue his claims in a civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).3  Accordingly, we will modify the 
District Court’s judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, 
and we will affirm the judgment as modified. 
                                                 
2 Parks maintains that the disciplinary incident at issue is his only infraction since his last 
parole hearing in 2012.  The DHO has provided evidence, however, indicating that Parks 
has received four additional disciplinary infractions since October 2012, including 
another one for “Engaging in a Sexual Act.” 
 
3 We express no opinion as to the merits of such an action. 
